We investigate the determinants of multiple-bank relationships using a new data set comprised of 1079 firms across twenty European countries. We document large cross-country variation in the average number of bank relationships per firm, uncovering a richness in European financial systems that extends beyond the standard description of being "bank-dominated". After controlling for a variety of firm-specific characteristics, we find that firms maintain more bank relationships, on average, in countries with inefficient judicial systems and poor enforcement of creditor rights. Firms also maintain more relationships in countries with strong, but decentralized banking systems and active public bond markets.
I. Introduction
In the seminal paper by Diamond (1984) , a bank arises as the optimal mechanism for channeling funds from investors to firms when costly information asymmetries exist between the investors and project insiders. The investors delegate the responsibility to the bank for monitoring firm cash flows, thereby avoiding both duplication of monitoring and free-riding. The efficient monitoring by the bank, in turn, leads to lower cost financing for the firm. Many other information-based theories of financial intermediation build on the similar idea that by coordinating investors a bank reduces both costly informational frictions and problems associated with renegotiation.
1 According to these theories, a firm in need of "one-shot" bank financing will optimally choose to borrow from one bank.
With repeated lending, a single bank relationship may not be optimal. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) argue that superior information enables a single bank to extract monopoly rents through future loans to the firm. They show that competition from an additional informed bank eliminates such "hold-up" costs. The implication from the Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) papers is that firms should maintain, at most, only a few bank relationships. Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Ongena and Smith (1998), and Harhoff and Körting (1998b) report statistics consistent with the one-bank (or few-bank) theories. Each reports the median number of bank relationships per sample firm to be one, and finds that multiple bank relationships, when they occur, consist of relatively few banks.
By way of contrast, our paper demonstrates that these popular theories do not satisfactorily describe many observed bank relationships. Using a new data set of 1079 large firms gathered from 20 European countries, we document that single-bank relationships are relatively uncommon and that many firms maintain relationships with many banks. Less than 15% of the firms in our sample maintain single-bank relationships, while 20% report using eight or more banks. Moreover, the distribution of number of bank relationships varies considerably across countries. For instance, no sample firm in Sweden or Norway maintains more than six bank relationships, but the majority of firms in Italy, Portugal and Spain maintain at least six bank relationships.
We devote the remainder of the paper to explaining this puzzling incidence of multiplebank relationships. From firm-and industry-level data, we first investigate whether the composition of firms within a country explains the variation across countries. Although some firm-level characteristics, such as size, significantly impact the choice of number of bank relationships, we find that they cannot alone explain the incidence of multiple-bank relationships. We therefore turn to investigating the "residual" cross-country variation not explained by firm characteristics.
Motivated by a relatively new set of theories, we argue that firms in some countries may have incentive to diversify across bank relationships, may benefit from lack of coordination across creditors, or may simply use banks as multiple transaction centers. We examine these conjectures by choosing variables related to the legal environment, banking system and development of capital markets within a country. These variables turn out to explain a large proportion of the variation left unexplained by the firm and industry variables.
We show that firms maintain, on average, more bank relationships in countries with unconcentrated banking systems, inefficient judicial systems and where the enforcement of creditors' rights is weak. Firms in countries with fragile banking systems also tend to use fewer banks, though the relation is nonlinear. Moreover, the average number of bank relationships is positively related to the sophistication of a country's public debt markets. Though these results are interesting, we suspend making strong statements about causality. It is likely that our variables are closely correlated with other country-level variables not included in the analysis and that some latent variable jointly determines the number of bank relationships and some of the explanatory variables.
Other papers incorporate number of bank relationships into their analysis, though to our knowledge, no paper has examined bank relationships at such a comprehensive level. Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Houston and James (1996) , Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) , Ongena and Smith (1998), and Harhoff and Körting (1998b) use number of bank relationships as an explanatory variable in regressions on other relationship characteristics. However, the focus of these papers is not on the choice of number of relationships. Our study is closer in spirit to Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (1997) and Harhoff and Körting (1998a) . Motivated by their observation that Italian firms tend to maintain many bank relationships while U.S. firms do not, Detragiache et al. (1997) develop a theory of choice of number of bank relationships. 2 Although they report summary bank statistics from the U.S. and Italy to help support their arguments, Detragiache et al. (1997) do not attempt to directly test the predictions of their model. We include such tests here. Harhoff and Körting (1998a) study the choice of number of creditors using detailed survey data on German firms with less than 500 employees. Their study emphasizes the impact the number of creditors has on the likelihood a firm later becomes distressed. In contrast, our analysis relies on a data set of relatively large firms from many countries and emphasizes the cross-country variation in number of bank relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the cross-country survey data. Section III motivates the choice, and discusses the construction, of the explanatory variables. Section IV presents the bulk of our results. Section V concludes. 
II. Cross-Country Data

B. Number of bank relationships by country and size
The survey asks participants to list the number of banks they use for cash management purposes within their own country. 4 We take the response to this question as our measure of number of bank relationships. We will justify its use in the next section. First, we summarize in Table 1 the distribution of the 1079 responses. According to the survey, the bulk of the firms maintain more than one bank relationship; only 14.5% of the firms report having a single bank relationship.
Among those firms that maintain multiple bank relationships, many use a large number of banks.
47% of the firms maintain between three and seven bank relationships, and another 20% use more than seven banks. Across all countries, the mean number of relationships is 5.6 and the median is 3.
Somewhat more startling is the variation in the distribution of number of relationships across countries. In Table 1 , we rank by average number of bank relationships per firm, the 20 countries and two coordination centers. Italy represents one end of the extreme. The median firm in Italy maintains 12 bank relationships. Only 3.1% of the firms maintain a single bank relationship, 70.3% maintain more than seven bank relationships, and one firm uses 70 bank relationships. But Italy is not an outlier. In Portugal, the median firm uses 10 banks, in France the median is nine banks, and in Belgium and Spain the median is seven. On average, 2.7% of the firms in these four countries use only one bank, while 54.2% use more than seven banks. By way of contrast, single-bank relationships are common in Norway, Sweden, the UK, and Ireland. On average, 24.2% of the firms in these countries use only one bank. The median firm uses two banks and 3.3% of the firms, on average, maintain more than seven bank relationships. The remaining countries fall somewhere in-between these two groupings. For example, with 91.9% of its firms maintaining more than two banks, and 40.5% maintaining more than seven, Greece is closer to the high-number countries. Switzerland, with a median of two bank relationships and 41.7% of its firms maintaining one bank relationship, is similar to the low-number countries. Table 3 reports the distribution of number of bank relationships according to the reported total domestic sales of the sample firm. We use sales as a proxy for firm size. Firms in the survey do not report exact sales figures. Instead, they categorize their total domestic sales into one of eight intervals, beginning with "less than $100 million" and ending with "greater than $10 billion". Our sample firms are evenly distributed across the eight categories, with the median firm reporting sales of between $1 billion and $2 billion. This makes the median firm in our sample much larger than the U.S. firms in Petersen and Rajan (1994) (with median book value of assets of roughly $300,000), and roughly the same size as the firms in Houston and James (1996) (with median sales of roughly $1.37 billion).
No strong pattern emerges in the average or median value of number of bank relationships across the categories. The median number of bank relationships across all categories is surprisingly stable at three or four. The table does indicate that the number of bank relationships is skewed to the right for larger firms. For instance, only 13.4% of firms with sales less than $100 million use more than seven banks. For firms with sales greater than $10 billion, the proportion is 30.4%.
The distribution of number of bank relationships across the countries suggests several stylized facts. First, multiple-bank relationships are common across all countries studied in this data set. Second, large firms tend to maintain more bank relationships. Third, for some countries, single-bank relationships are exceptionally rare and multiple-bank relationships consist of many banks. For these countries, it is unlikely that monopoly bank relationships are optimal and it does not appear that the motive for holding multiple-bank relationships originates from the desire to mitigate holdup costs. Fourth, the observed distribution of number of bank relationships in other countries is consistent with theories that suggest that one, or a few, banks is optimal.
Beginning in Section III, we explore possible reasons for why we observe such variation in number of bank relationships across different countries. Before doing so, we discuss in more detail our definition of a bank relationship.
C. Definition of bank relationship
Because banking theories typically focus on lending relationships, our definition in terms of cash management services appears mismatched with the theory. On the contrary, responses to the survey suggest that short-term lending is one of the most important activities in cash management. Table 3 groups, by country, response rates to the question, "What operations come under the heading of cash management in the company in which you are working?" 90.2% of the sample firms list at least one of three lending-related activities -short-term funding (up to one year), trade finance, and managing creditors, payables and payments -as part of their cash management operations. These choices as a group are second in popularity only to liquidity-related activities. Moreover, out the 11 individual activities, "short-term funding (up to one year)" is the second most popular choice, after "liquidity management".
5
The predominance of short-term debt in Europe (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) , 
III. Motivation and Description of Explanatory Variables
A. Theory
In early information-based theories, like Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) , and Boot and Thakor (1994) , banks arise as coalitions of investors devoted to reducing either redundant monitoring or the costs of renegotiation. These theories imply that a firm in need of bank financing will find it optimal to borrow from only one bank. However, a sole bank also has monopoly access to private information about the firm. Such a bank can exploit this monopoly power in the future, either by charging the firm higher interest on new loans, or by threatening not to extend additional credit. Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (1995) argue that a firm can avoid these holdup costs by establishing a relationship with another firm. Still, Petersen and Rajan (1994) argue that a single bank relationship may be optimal in a repeated-lending setting if competition from other banks impedes the ability for the monopoly bank to construct accommodative pricing arrangements.
In any case, because the above arguments imply that we should only observe single-bank relationships, or multiple-bank relationships with relatively few banks, they cannot adequately explain the data described here. We now consider three arguments for why firms may want to maintain many bank relationships.
Diversification of bank relationships
Firms may have incentive to diversify across bank relationships when the risk of losing a given bank relationship is high. For example, Detragiache et al. (1997) consider the impact of exogenous bank defaults on a firm's choice of number of bank relationships. They show that a firm will insure itself against the loss of value-relevant information, in case of bank default, by maintaining more than one inside bank relationship. Moreover, as long as the banking system is not "too fragile", the optimal number of bank relationships held by a firm will be positively related to the fragility of a country's banking system. However, if the likelihood of bank default is too high, the net benefit of an inside relationship drops to the point where only one bank is optimal. Detragiache et al. (1997) also conjecture that a more efficient bankruptcy process increases the net liquidation value of a borrowing firm, which in turn makes it less costly for a given bank to finance the firm. They therefore predict number of bank relationships to be positively related to the efficiency of a country's bankruptcy procedure
Lack of coordination of investors
The legal environment of a country may influence the benefits and costs to lending through investor coalitions. In fact, for some countries, lack of coordination among investors may actually help align the incentives of firm managers with the investors in a firm. For instance, Hart (1995) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) argue that borrowing from multiple lenders reduces the incentive for a manager to strategically default on a loan. If a firm defaults, the manager must coordinate a restructuring plan with multiple claimants, each of whom can free ride or hold up the negotiation process. 7 Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) derive an expression for the optimal number of creditors that trades off the benefits of preventing strategic defaults with the cost of foregoing efficient liquidations.
Increasing the cost of strategic default by maintaining multiple creditors will be important in countries where the deadweight costs of bankruptcy are low or where company managers are protected under bankruptcy regulations. For example, bankruptcy procedures in some countries impose an automatic stay, preventing senior creditors from gaining possession of company assets and allowing managers to remain in control. Moreover, bankruptcy codes, such as Chapter 11 in the U.S., explicitly protect incumbent managers during bankruptcy. Therefore, value-maximizing firms may have an incentive to maintain multiple bank relationships in countries where creditor protections are weak, in order to properly discipline management.
Banks as transactions centers
We hypothesize that structures influencing the tradeoff between a bank-dominated and capital market economy may also influence the average number of bank relationships. However, the direction of such a relationship is unclear. Boot and Thakor (1996) argue that banks may compete on a transactions-oriented basis in economies with weak capital markets, but compete for relationship lending in an economy with strong capital markets. If multiple-bank lending simply serves as a substitute for capital market financing (which typically involves many lenders), then we should observe economies with stronger capital markets having, on average, fewer bank relationships per firm.
B. Explanatory Variables
Our cross-sectional analysis of number of bank relationships includes firm-specific variables, industry dummies, and country-level variables. We use the firm-specific characteristics and industry dummies mainly as control variables. We focus our greatest attention on the country-level variables. Table 4 provides a summary of the variable definitions. Table 3 provides summary statistics, by country, for the firm-level characteristics. Appendix 1 provides summary information by industry. Table 5 list the values of the country variables.
Firm-specific and industry dummy variables
The first firm-specific variable is size. We measure size using the categorical variables (described in Section II.A) for home and world-wide sales, measured in U.S. dollars. We conjecture that larger firms will require more bank relationships, because as firms grow, their service requirements and financing needs may exceed the capacity of any one bank in their country. The frequency distributions in Table 2 mildly support this conjecture. We also include a proxy for the breadth of potential bank services required as part of a cash management relationship. We define Relationship
Scope to be the number of activities, out of a possible 11, considered by the respondent to be a part of cash management. If banks are limited in the type of services they can offer, then number of bank relationships should be positively related to Relationship Scope. As a direct measure of the perceived importance of bank relationships, we also include the variable Relationship Importance.
This variable is an assessment by the surveyed cash manager of the importance of a relationship, among a set of eight possible criteria, when choosing to allocate business across banks. The variable takes on an integer value between zero and five, with zero corresponding to "least important" and five being "most important". If banks serve only as transaction centers for firms with many bank relationships, then number of bank relationships should be negatively related to
Relationship Importance. Finally, we include industry dummies for 46 specific industries.
Different industries have different external financing requirements and some industries may be more reliant on bank financing than others (see Rajan and Zingales (1995) ). We use our detailed industry classifications to control for such variation. the relationship between number of bank relationships and bank fragility is non-monotonic, we also include the squared value of Bank Fragility in our analysis.
Country-level Variables
We include two variables to study the impact of bankruptcy regulation and procedures on the incentive to coordinate creditors. The first, Judicial Efficiency, measures the efficiency and integrity of the business legal environment in a country. Business International Corporation produces this assessment, which is a score between zero (low efficiency) and 10 (high efficiency).
We obtain the scores from Mauro (1995) . With the second variable, Creditor Rights*Rule of Law, we proxy the extent to which creditor rights are protected in a country by multiplying an index of creditor rights by an assessment for the rule of law in a country. Both variables are from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . They form the creditor rights index by considering a country's laws regarding creditor restrictions on other stakeholders (such as minimum dividends or consent to file for reorganization), plus laws regarding automatic stays, guarantees of priority, and who obtains control during bankruptcy. The index ranges between zero and four, with a four corresponding to the strongest creditor rights laws. We use the rule of law variable as a proxy for the enforcement tradition in country. We use the product of the two variables because enforcement of creditor protection laws may be lax in some countries.
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The deadweight cost of bankruptcy procedures should be lower in countries with a high value for Judicial Efficiency. If low bankruptcy costs make it easier for firm managers to strategically default, then firm investors may demand multiple creditors in order to "harden" the manager's budget constraint. Therefore, we predict that firms operating within efficient judicial systems will prefer to maintain more bank relationships (Detragiache et al. (1997) make the same prediction using a different argument). On the other hand, creditor protection laws increase the cost of strategic default, serving as a substitute hard budget constraint to multiple creditors. Therefore, we predict that countries with strictly enforced creditor protection laws will have fewer bank relationships.
To measure the influence of capital market development on the number of bank relationships, we include variables that proxy for the relative importance of equity and bond markets in a given economy. Equity Market/GNP is the ratio of the market value of the stock market held by small shareholders to gross national product ( Finally, we control for the degree of bank concentration within a country using the variable Concentration Ratio, defined to be the percentage of total banking assets in 1993 accounted for by a country's three largest banks. For Norway, the source is Nordal and Naerland (1995), for all other countries the source is Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997) . Following Dewatripont and Maskin (1995),
we hypothesize that countries with a high bank concentration will have fewer bank relationships.
IV. Cross-Country Regressions
A. Firm-level regressions
We begin our cross-sectional investigation with firm-level regressions of number of bank relationships on firm-specific characteristics, industry dummy variables, and country-level variables. The results are in Table 6 . Because number of bank relationships is discrete-valued and truncated, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the slope coefficient and standard errors will be biased. We report estimates from Tobit regressions, but check all our results with both OLS and two specifications of a "count" model. 9 In signs and significance, our results are similar across all specifications, but the Tobit specification is advantageous for two reasons. First, it corrects for the truncation bias induced by the fact that number of bank relationships cannot be negative. Second, like OLS, Tobit produces coefficient estimates that directly represent the marginal impact of a unit change in an explanatory variable on the dependent variable. This makes later analysis simpler to interpret. Though a count model corrects for both truncation bias and the discrete nature of the data, it produces coefficient estimates that are more difficult to interpret.
Variation in types of firms across countries could explain the differences observed in Table   1 . For example, if Italian firms tend to be relatively large motor vehicle sales companies, then the high average number of bank relationships in Italy could be due to the composition of firms there, not necessarily to separate country effects. Indeed, Models (1) and (2) in Table 6 Table 1 . By including the country dummies, the pseudo-linear fit of the model jumps to 56.5%, a level that easily rejects the null that the fit is no better than in model (2). Moreover, once we add the country dummies, the bulk of the firm-specific characteristic are no longer significant.
The exception is home sales, which remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Therefore, country identity captures substantial variation left unexplained by the firm-level variables and even dominates characteristics that were previously significant. Of course, that a majority of the country dummy estimates are statistically significant (i.e., different from Norway)
provides little information about their cross-sectional variation. For instance, common factors across groups of countries could induce correlation in the estimates. We investigate this possibility in the next subsection.
First, we turn to whether the country-level variables explain variation in number of bank relationships not captured by the country dummies. To do this, we would prefer to simply add the country-level variables to the specification in model (3). Unfortunately, using both country-level variables and the country dummies in the same regression creates collinear columns of data.
10 Therefore, in model (5), we instead replace the country dummies with the country-level variables and compare pseudo-R 2 s across the two specifications. One problem remains with the two models.
We lack complete country-level data on four countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg and Poland). Model (4) is identical to model (3), except that it drops observations from the three missing countries, leaving 898 observations. With the removal of the four countries, the pseudo-R 2 increases to nearly 80%, but the magnitude and significance of the estimates remain the same.
According to model (5), the cross-country variables also strongly influence the choice of number of bank relationships. The pseudo-R 2 in model (5) is 74.6%, compared with 79.6% in model (4) and the estimates in model (5) easily reject the hypothesis that the country-level variables add nothing to the fit of model (2) (using a version of (2) that drops the missing observations). Model (5) indicates that firms maintain more bank relationships in countries with unconcentrated and strong banking systems, weak enforcement of creditor rights, inefficient judicial systems and active bond markets.
The comparison between models (4) and (5) leaves unclear the extent to which the countrylevel variables account for the variation in number of bank relationships across countries. Below, we introduce a more direct method for measuring this association. At that point, we discuss in more detail the regression results of model (5).
B. Using country residuals
Multiple regression econometrics yields a useful interpretation of the country dummy estimates reported in models (3) and (4) of Table 6 . Each estimate is an average, for a given country, of the residual number of bank relationships left unexplained by firm and industry characteristics. In other words, the estimates provide us with a country-by-country adjustment for the impact of composition-of-firms within a country. In the analysis to follow, we will refer to estimates as country "residuals".
Common variation across groupings of countries is apparent both in Table 1 based on results external to this paper. Second, the classification is a logical first step in determining the influence of the legal and institutional framework of a country on the average number of bank relationships. Table 7 contains the results. We start by testing whether we can reject the joint hypothesis that all of the country intercepts are equal. As can be seen in the row labeled "All", this hypothesis is easily rejected. We then test whether we can reject the hypothesis that the residual estimates are equal within the groupings and across groupings. For tests of equality within groups, legal origin explains some, but not all of the variation in the country residual estimates. For example, we cannot reject the hypothesis of coefficient equality among countries of English or Eastern European origin.
That is, the country residuals within these groupings are statistically of the same magnitude. The test of Scandinavian countries produces a chi-squared value rejecting equality at the 10% level.
However, with chi-squared values of 132 and 15.8, we can easily reject the hypothesis that the country residual estimates are equal inside the French and German law countries. These are the countries found in La Porta et al. (1997) to have the weakest investor protections and leastdeveloped capital markets. Our results suggest that these countries also have additional variation in the number of bank relationships that cannot be explained by legal origin alone.
We next examine the variation across the country groupings by replacing the country dummy variables in Table 6 , model (3) with dummy variables corresponding to legal grouping. We set the Scandinavian country grouping equal to zero. In the lower half of Table 7 , we report the results of the Wald test that all of the grouping dummies are equal to zero and a tableau of pair-wise
Wald tests between each grouping. This portion of the table indicates that equality across all legal origin groups is strongly rejected, and that many pair-wise comparisons are also rejected.
C. Country-level regressions: Spanning tests
In this section, we obtain a feel for how much of the cross-country variation in number of bank relationships can be accounted for by the country-level variables. We center our examination around OLS regressions of the country residuals on the country-level variables. The idea is that such regressions will test whether the seven chosen variables "span" the country residuals in the sense that they explain the cross-country variation not accounted for by the firm-level regressions. Table 8 reports the results using the 18 countries for which we have country-level data.
Model (1) in that table excludes the bank fragility and legal variables. The model (1) regression indicates that number of bank relationships across countries is negatively related to the value of the equity market and to the level of bank concentration within a country. Not surprisingly, firms in countries dominated by a few banks tend to maintain relatively fewer bank relationships. In addition, the estimates suggest that firms with access to well-developed, liquid equity markets require fewer bank relationships per firm.
However, the development of a country's banking system and its capital markets may be endogenously related to the legal environment of the country. Models (2) and (3) Table 6 , model (5). The equity market and concentration estimates remain robust, although the statistical significance of Equity Market/GNP falls to the 10%
level. In addition, the bond market variable becomes positively related to number of bank relationships, suggesting that strong bond markets and number of bank relationships are complements. Boot and Thakor (1996) conjecture the possibility of such complementarity when bank connections are relationship-oriented. The fact that 80% of surveyed managers choose "bank relationship management" to be a primary cash management activity suggests that the bank relationships in our sample are relationship-oriented.
More striking is the statistical significance and sign of the bank fragility and legal variables.
The coefficient on Bank Fragility enters with a negative and statistically significant sign, while (Bank Fragility) 2 is positive and significant, implying a non-monotonic (quadratic) relationship between average number of bank relationships and bank fragility, though in the wrong direction predicted by Detragiache et al. (1997) . To see this more clearly, Figure 1 plots number of bank relationships as a function of bank fragility using the coefficient estimates from Bank Fragility and (Bank Fragility) 2 . For countries with a mean credit rating of six or above, the number of bank of relationships is increasing in the fragility of the banking system. For countries with lower rankings, the number of relationships is decreasing in fragility. The coefficient estimate associated with Judicial Efficiency remains negative and statistically significant. In addition, Creditor Rights*Rule of Law also becomes negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with our conjecture that strong creditor rights enforcement serves as a substitute hard budget constraint for multiple creditors. However, the negative sign on both legal variables may suggest a role for the overall efficiency of bankruptcy procedures that we cannot explain.
D. Robustness checks
When adjusting for size in the regressions of Table 6 , we ignore the possibility that relative size of a firm within a given country may be more important than size in absolute dollar terms. To control for this possibility, we add interaction variables to the regression of model (3), allowing sales to vary by country. We find statistically significant interactions in three countries. Relatively large firms in Italy and Germany maintain significantly more relationships than other large firms in the sample, but large firms maintain relatively fewer bank relationships in Belgium. Adding the interaction variables do not impact the significance of the size variable alone and do not alter any of the later regressions. We check the sensitivity of these results by replacing size with measures of relative size including size divided by country GDP and size divided by the total bank assets of the country. All results remain robust.
We also re-estimate the model eliminating all firms in the Finance and Building Societies and Insurance and Pension Fund industries. Because these industries are finance-related, they may maintain many bank relationships for reasons other than those discussed here. Dropping firms in these industries has no impact on our results. All results are also unaffected when drop all firms that did not report "short-term funding (up to one year)" as a cash management activity. This exercise focuses exclusively on firms that most likely maintain a credit relationship with their banks.
In Table 8 , we estimate up to eight coefficients using only eighteen observations. The fact that all coefficient estimates for model (3) are significant at the 10% level or better suggests the possibility that our model overfits the data. As a rough gauge of the reasonableness of our estimates, we perform the following exercise. First, we substitute the mean values of the countrylevel variables for two countries not contained in the data set, the US and Japan, to obtain fitted values for the country residuals. We use these fitted values -6.71 for the US and 2.91 for Japanalong with the estimates and data from Table 6 to back out the implied average number of relationships for the US and Japan. We obtain an estimate of 8.22 relationships for the U.S. and 4.42 for Japan. These results are of the same magnitude as reported by Houston and James (1996) , where the average number of banks per US firm is 5.22, and Horuichi (1994) , where the average for Japanese firms is between 3.4 and 7.7.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
To our knowledge, this paper provides the first comprehensive look at the variation in number of bank relationships across firms and countries. Employing the responses from a large cross-sectional survey of corporate treasurers and cash managers in Europe, we document large variation in the average number of bank relationships per country and investigate both firm-specific and countryspecific determinants of the number of bank relationships. It is typical for most firms in some countries to maintain many bank relationships, while in other countries, it is more common to maintain one bank relationship. Using a methodology analogous to spanning tests, we explore the ability for country-level variables to explain the portion of the variation in average number of bank relationships not explained by firm and industry-level variables. We find that characteristics of both the banking system and the legal environment are important in capturing the variation in number of bank relationships across countries. However, caution should be taken when drawing inferences from our results. The country-level variables are most likely highly correlated with other characteristics not discussed here. Number of Bank Relationships Number of domestic cash management relationships.
Country and Industry Dummies
Industry Dummies Forty-six industry dummies (no dummy for non-specified industries). See Appendix 1 for identity of industries
Country Dummies
Twenty-one country dummies (no dummy for Norway).
Firm-specific Characteristics
Home Sales Annual home country sales.
World Wide Sales
Annual world-wide sales. 
Relationship Scope
An index aggregating the activities that a survey respondent includes under the heading of "cash management". The index is formed by adding 1 for each of the following responses: bank relationship management, liquidity management, account/ balance management, payments, reconciliation of bank statements, short-term investment (up to one year), managing debtors/receivables/collections, short-term funding (up to one year), trade finance, managing creditors/payables/payments, foreign exchange transactions and foreign exchange hedging.
Relationship Importance
Assessment by the survey respondent of the relative importance of a bank relationship in allocating business between existing banks among a set of eight other specified criteria and an openended "other" criterion (0 = least important, 5 = most important).
Fragility of the Banking Sector
Bank fragility Average credit rating of tracked banks within a country. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores implying less bank default risk. Sources: Moody's Investors Service 1996:5 and Credit Ratings International 1995:IV (FT Financial Publishing) .
Legal Variables
Judicial Efficiency Assessment of the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms", produced by Business International Corporation. Average between 1980 and 1983. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores implying lower efficiency levels. Source: Mauro (1995).
Creditor rights
Description from La Porta et al. (1997), Table I : "An index aggregating creditor rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends, to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) the debtor does not retain the reorganization; (4) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. The index ranges from 0 to 4". Source: La Porta et al. (1997) .
Rule of Law
Description from La Porta et al. (1997), Table I : "Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for low and order." Source: La Porta et al. (1997) .
Dependence on Public capital Markets
Equity Market / GNP
The ratio of the stock market capitalization, held by small shareholders, to gross national product for 1994. "Small shareholders" is the average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest nonfinancial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country. Source: La Porta et al. (1997) .
Bond Market / GNP Ratio of the market value of domestic private sector debt securities to GNP at the end of 1995. Source: International Capital Markets 1997:11, Table 12 (International Monetary Fund) .
Banking Industry Structure
Concentration Ratio
Percentage of total banking system assets accounted for by the largest three banks in 1993. Sources: Nordal and Naerland (1995) (Table 2b) and Barth et al. (1997) (Table 2) . Table 6 . *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The likelihood ratio test statistic -2log(L(θ i )/L(θ j )) is asymptotically distributed χ 2 (d). *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
APPENDIX 2. COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES ON INDUSTRY DUMMY VARIABLES
